There is no denying that the "Arab spring" has not turned out well for European leaders. Having missed the boat on the Jasmin Revolution, they waited until the very last minute before jumping on the bandwagon of the anti-Mubarak revolt in Egypt. The hope was that they would be able to redeem themselves with their response to the uprising that began in Libya in mid-February. Sadly, it now appears that they have fluffed yet another opportunity to weigh on the course of international events and to play a central role on the world stage. And the reasons for this failure are depressingly familiar: amateurism, divisions, pussyfooting, and a lack of long-term vision.

They showed themselves to be amateurs, because they were counting on the inevitability of a domino effect: in the wake of the downfall of Ben Ali in Tunisia, and Mubarak in Egypt, they assumed that Gaddafi had no hope of clinging to power, and in so doing demonstrated their feeble understanding of the Jamahiriya and the system of power established by its leader, which has prevailed for the last 40 years.

They showed themselves to be divided and unable to take the initiative: after the start of the uprising, they let three weeks go by before sitting down to discuss the EU’s response. When a meeting was finally held, the sternest measure to emerge from the Extraordinary European Council of 11 March proved to be a pledge to examine "all necessary options" so as to "to protect the civilian population." This was presented along with a call “for the rapid holding of a summit between the Arab League, the African Union and the European Union,” and a demand that Gaddafi whose regime was “no longer an interlocutor for the EU “should “relinquish power immediately.” But it was hardly enough to persuade a desperate dictator to give up the ghost.

While this was happening, the tide was turning in Libya where the power struggle was once again going Gaddafi’s way — a fact that highlighted the truly shortsighted and precarious nature of the European position. Having blocked any possibility of an "honourable" exit for the Libyan dictator, and having rejected a Franco-British proposal for a no-fly zone — read “military intervention” — on the pretext that the conditions (indiscriminate attacks on civilians, a UN Security Council resolution and support from Arab countries) were not fulfilled, and finally by refusing to provide other forms of aid to the Libyan National Council, the Europeans took the risk of allowing the Colonel regain lost ground. No one expected the resurgence of what Le Temps journalist Serge Michel has described as "prosperous version of North Korea on the Mediterranean," which is why no one took the trouble to develop a “plan B” to deal with the eventuality of Gaddafi’s continued control: yet another major miscalculation.

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