Cas Mudde: in 2025, Europe must learn to stand on its own two feet

A popular belief holds that the European Union (EU) makes its greatest progress in times of crisis. If this is true, 2025 will undoubtedly become a great year for “Europe”. Unfortunately, this belief is primarily held inside the Brussels Bubble, where it is grounded more in wishful thinking than in political reality. Most “progress” that the EU achieves during “crises” is either pushing the problem further down the road or coming up with a solution that inevitably creates a future problem. 

That next year will create yet another “crisis”, or at least major challenge, for the EU is almost certain. As 2024 ends, the governments in both France and Germany, together the so-called “engine of European integration”, have lost their parliamentary majority and function as lame-duck administrations.

Germany will hold crucial elections in February 2025, but while the polls show a clear winner, the Christian Democratic CDU-CSU, coalition formation will be difficult given the strength of the far-right AfD – one of the few far-right parties still to face a cordon sanitaire in Europe. In contrast, French president Emmanuel Macron remains stubbornly committed to coalition governments that lack a viable parliamentary majority, like the one lead by François Bayrou since 23 December.

As is often the case when faced with a lack of progress on the domestic front, Macron is turning his attention to foreign policy, especially European policy. Bypassing Germany, particularly over the war in Ukraine, he is increasingly seeking support in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, with the enthusiastic support of the new EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Estonian anti-Russian hawk Kaja Kallas. But despite the enthusiasm for a continued tough stance on Russia and strong support for Ukraine among some regional leaders, the strongest opposition also comes from this region (notably Hungary and Slovakia).

Of course, the real challenge for the EU comes from Washington, DC, where Donald Trump returns to power on 20 January. While Trump has no vision for an alternative world order, he has staked much of his political reputation on “bringing peace” to Ukraine – and on ensuring that the US stops paying billions of dollars to that country. On Europe, Trump is the anti-Joe Biden, a Cold War era transatlantic believer, who was out of step with even many in his own party and electorate. For Trump, Europe is a competitor first and an ally second. Similarly, NATO is more a of protection racket than a collective security alliance.

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The EU is losing both its strongest foreign supporter and its strongest foreign protector at a time when it is more divided than ever and its traditional "engine" is running out of fuel

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The return of Trump will certainly change the EU, but whether it will be for the better remains to be seen. First, it will empower far-right “Trump whisperers” like Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Giorgia Meloni in Italy. Second, it will lead to the full normalisation of Trump and his outrageous behaviour and ideas – which is already on full display in the actions of Macron and others, like Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof. This will not only push the EU further to the right on issues like climate change and immigration, as it did in the last European elections, but is also likely to weaken support for Ukraine.

But more importantly, the replacement of Biden by Trump will put an incredible strain on the EU itself. Even if Trump does not actively sabotage the EU itself by playing member states against each other, or EU foreign policy by supporting EU opponents, the US withdrawal from Europe will leave a huge political vacuum that the EU and its member states will have to fill. Although it is rarely mentioned, the US has been instrumental in the shaping and success of the EU, initiating and pressuring European actions and decisions both during and after the Cold War. 

The EU is losing both its strongest foreign supporter and its strongest foreign protector at a time when it is more divided than ever and its traditional "engine" is running out of fuel. It is not too difficult to muddle through crises, which is what the EU has been doing for much of the time, especially if you can hide behind the big back of a superpower. But now the EU will have to come up with not only its own foreign and security policy, but also the financial and military means to back it up. All this while the far right plays a major role in a majority of EU member states, as well as in all the major EU institutions, and has a sympathetic ear in the White House.

The most striking aspect of all this is that the writing has been on the wall for almost a decade. You can blame Trump for a lot of things, but not for not being clear about what he does and does not want. His first administration has already shown that he means what he says, and that the "adults in the room" can at best do damage control. But in true European fashion, the EU kicked the issue down the road and quickly forgot about it as Biden returned transatlantic relations to the heyday of the 20th century. Absorbed by internal divisions at both European and national levels, European politicians have chosen to ignore the elephant in the room, even when it is staring them in the face with a grin.

As debates about "strategic autonomy" once again dominate the Brussels bubble and hundreds of articles and op-eds argue its importance, the EU is once again behind the curve. Without a vision, internally divided and weakened, it will be forced to play a much larger role in the world's major conflicts, from Gaza and Syria to Russia and Ukraine, and it will have to act largely alone and immediately, not covered by the US or in a few years' time.

A bleak view indeed... unless, of course, you live in the Brussels bubble and believe that the EU thrives in times of crisis.

🤝 This article is published within the Come Together collaborative project