Who won the European elections – Ukraine or Russia?

The European Parliament elections of 6-9 June were watched closely in both Russia and Ukraine. For this report I looked not only at Russia's independent media, but also at the state-run Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Russian Gazette) so as to understand the Kremlin's interpretation of the results (do not feel obliged to click through). From this government mouthpiece you will learn that,

"The results of the vote were a wake-up call for the Kiev regime and showed that the pro-Ukrainian and Russophobic policy of the authorities of many countries, above all France and Germany, has failed, and that forces opposing further military support for Kiev and in favour of resuming close relations with Moscow are gaining ground."

In other words, from the Russian point of view, the purpose of the European Parliament elections was to allow Europeans to choose between supporting Russia or Ukraine in the war. This is a rather reductionist view of the situation, but the article's author did not forget to add that "more and more Europeans are turning to more radical parties which they hope will finally solve their problems".

What problems are we talking about?

"Many voters have been affected by rising prices for goods and services, are concerned about migration and the cost of the green transition, and are particularly sensitive to geopolitical tensions, including the conflict in Ukraine and the transfer of public funds to Kiev."

In the view of the Kremlin, Europeans are losing sleep because of their countries' support for Ukraine, and would prefer the war to end as soon as possible with the satisfaction of all Russia's demands. Such fantasies are typical in the worldview of Russian officialdom. The usual line is that Europe cannot cope without Russia and its energy resources, and that Europeans will therefore be ready to sell out Ukraine in return for the restoration of their gas supplies.

And yet we must be clear: the decent results of Alternative for Germany (AfD) and France’s Rassemblement National (RN) are indeed a reason for Putin to rejoice. The AfD is overtly anti-European and pro-Russian, while Marine Le Pen has a long history of connivance with the Kremlin which has included accepting preferential loans from Russian banks. Admittedly, Le Pen has changed her rhetoric since Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2022, if only as a sop to the French electorate. Yet concerns remain about ongoing links between the RN’s inner circle and the Kremlin.

Ukrainians have also been talking about the European election results. Serhiy Sydorenko, editor of Yevropeiska Pravda (European Pravda) – a respected online magazine that focuses on Ukraine's European vocation – takes an optimistic line on the new ideological tilt of the new parliament, observing that "right-wing does not always mean bad". 

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Notwithstanding the far-right's win in France and second-place in Germany, Sydorenko observes that the European right's many traditional conservatives are generally pro-Ukrainian. As an example he cites Giorgia Meloni, who has become an outspoken advocate of Ukraine. (One might quibble with his classification of Meloni as a traditional conservative.) Sydorenko believes that, on the specific issue of support for Ukraine, "right-wing revanchism in the EP is certainly no bad thing". By his calculations, more than 500 MEPs are now unequivocal in their support for Ukraine.

The editor of Yevropeiska Pravda recognises the reality of most post-election commentary, which has focused on the political impact of the results within individual countries. After all, it is at national level that many important issues will be decided, including arms supplies and other support to Ukraine.

Here the show was stolen, of course, by France, where the RN's drubbing of Emmanuel Macron's ruling party (by a margin of two to one) prompted the French president to dissolve parliament and call early elections. Not only France but the whole of Europe is still reeling from that decision. The result of France's political earthquake will become known in a few weeks.

In Belgium, meanwhile, the EP vote was held at the same time as national elections, which were lost by the formation of the prime minister, Alexander de Croo. The best result was obtained by the New Flemish Alliance (N-Va), which unexpectedly edged out the far-right Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) by a few percentage points. Conclusions on Belgium's future foreign policy will now need to wait for the new government to take shape, which may take months.

In Serhiy Sydorenko's view, the Belgian situation is a challenge for Ukraine – but the French one is a misfortune. Perhaps the RN, which everyone expects to win the upcoming election, would not be as overtly pro-Putin as it once was, but its style of government may be similar to Viktor Orbán's. The new government might well urge President Macron (who theoretically retains control of foreign policy) to pull back from supporting Ukraine and instead take up a comfortable neutral position. Such an outcome would be hugely welcome in Russia, especially given that Macron has in recent months assumed the role of the EU's most courageous leader on the war issue (if only in terms of rhetoric).

It was the French president who broke the taboo on putting Nato troops in Ukraine, obviously at the request and with the consent of Kyiv. The Kremlin's furious response to such declarations has been a disinformation offensive against France. Should the RN emerge victorious in France’s upcoming election, the impact on French foreign policy remains something of a mystery.

Talking of Orbán, his position has just been visibly weakened. Despite winning its European Parliament election with 44 percent support, Fidesz has lost three seats. In Hungary, serious political competition has at last emerged in the form of Peter Magyar's TISZA party, which scored nearly 30 percent. Is Hungary at last waking up? We will need to wait till its general election in two years' time.

The far right is also on the rise in Poland. The ultraliberal, anti-European and pro-Russian Confederation alliance obtained third place in the European election. That is a success, because for years Poland has been torn into two camps by a sterile struggle between two conservative parties with their roots in the anti-communist opposition – Jarosław Kaczyński's PiS (Law and Justice) and Donald Tusk's PO (Civic Platform). If, in the next few years, Confederation were to break their duopoly – and the group scored particularly well among 18 to 29-year-olds, at 30 percent – that would be the darkest possible scenario.

For Poland’s incumbent prime minister, Donald Tusk, this election was supposed to be an opportunity to consolidate his lead over his eternal enemy, PiS. Exit polls gave Tusk's Civic Coalition around 38 percent of the vote, to 34 percent for PiS. But by Monday morning its lead had narrowed to a single percentage point, which would give it only a one-seat advantage in the European Parliament.

On the other hand, the minority parties of Poland's ruling coalition, without which Donald Tusk's government could not have been formed – the centrist Third Way and the Left – did poorly. Both were teetering on the threshold necessary to obtain seats. Some in Civic Coalition have responded with schadenfreude, which may come as a surprise given that the ruling coalition has been gaining a reputation for weakness due to its internal conflicts. Without its partners, Tusk's party does not have the majority necessary to govern. The good showing of PiS shows that its disintegration is not imminent despite predictions by numerous liberal commentators, of whom many had been asking whether Kaczynski's party would make it to the 2025 presidential election. From today's perspective, that same question might be asked of Tusk's shaky coalition.