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We have discussed those issues with Gefjon Off, Javier Lorente Fontaneda, and Cristiano Vezzoni. Gefjon Off is a postdoctoral researcher in Comparative Politics at the University of Hamburg (Germany). Her research lies at the intersection of gender and politics, political behavior and comparative politics. Her PhD dissertation explores antifeminism and radical right support.
Javier Lorente Fontaneda is Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Law and Political Science at the University Rey Juan Carlos (Spain). He works in the field of Political Behaviour, focusing on young people’s relationship with politics, the development of political attitudes and the formation of political generations.
Cristiano Vezzoni is a professor of political sociology in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Milan (Italy) and scientific coordinator at the spsTREND laboratory. He is also president of the Italian National Election Studies (ITANES) association.
Across Europe, a growing share of young voters appear to be turning away from traditional parties and towards more radical political alternatives – both on the far right and the far left. The shift has raised alarms among political leaders and commentators, but for those who study political behaviour, the phenomenon is more complex, and in some ways less surprising, than it may seem.
“I wouldn’t say this is new,” says Gefjon Off. “I believe it is quite accepted and also expected that young people tend to be more radical and once they grow older, they usually converge a bit towards the center.”
For Off, this pattern is part of a broader life cycle. Political identities, she explains, are not fixed from birth. They are built gradually, shaped by experience, socialisation, and repetition. “It is quite normal and it has to do with some sort of rebellion phase and also with weaker partisan identity, of course,” she says. Partisan identity, the individual's identification with a party based on its values and program, builds up with age. “Young people don't grow up with the same partisan identity and so it does not play the same role for young people, which also results in them being more likely to change parties between elections.”
In Spain, Javier Lorente Fontaneda sees both continuity and change. “Young people in Spain seem to be increasingly voting for both radical-right and radical-left parties,” he says. But while support for radical-left parties fits a long historical pattern, “the shift of young people towards radical-right movements is a relatively new phenomenon.”
Several explanations are possible. Some young voters may be expressing dissatisfaction with mainstream politics. In that sense, voting for radical-right parties may be a way of expressing discontent, Lorente Fontaneda says. Others may be influenced by the political messages they encounter online. “They may be genuinely moving towards right-wing positions, influenced by different stimuli, such as discourses circulating on social media and digital networks.”
‘The shift of young people towards radical-right movements is a relatively new phenomenon’ – Javier Lorente Fontaneda
These digital environments, he notes, are saturated with ideological content. “We know that anti-feminist, xenophobic, authoritarian, nationalist and similar discourses are increasingly present in digital environments. This may be affecting political socialisation and helping to explain why young people are becoming closer to radical-right parties.”
At the same time, the broader picture remains consistent with past trends. At least since the 1960, Lorente Fontaneda explains, young people have traditionally been closer to left-wing and radical-left parties in Spain, as well as in many other Western countries. For him, “this is therefore not surprising but rather a well-established pattern.”
A militant youth?
If young voters are shifting politically, are they also becoming more engaged?
Here too, the answer is not straightforward.
“I think it might depend on the country as well,” Off says. “But in some countries, we see a very engaged young generation at the moment. Like in Germany, for instance, or in Spain.”
‘I wouldn’t say that this generation is not political’ – Gefjon Off
Elsewhere, the trend may be different. “Sweden's current young generation is not particularly more mobilised than previous generations – rather the opposite,” she adds.
Mobilisation, she suggests, often depends on visible figures and collective dynamics. “It also depends on what kind of young actors, like prominent influencers there are, because they play a big role in mobilising. We see very large demonstrations, and a lot of young people who take to the streets in those demonstrations. Therefore, I wouldn't say that this generation is not political.”
Lorente Fontaneda agrees that political participation varies by age and over time. “Party identification develops over time and is closely related to the life cycle: the older individuals are, the stronger their party identification tends to be,” he says. “This has been well documented since the 1960s.”
Participation itself also follows age-related patterns. “Young people tend to vote less than adults, and this has consistently been the case in Western democracies,” he says. But they may be more visible in other forms of engagement.
Age and engagement
While Lorente Fontaneda agress that young people tend to participate more in demonstrations, “protest cycles are irregular, which makes comparisons more complex.”
Cristiano Vezzoni sees deeper transformations in how young people relate to politics: “What is most likely happening is that the array of participation among younger generations is shifting toward forms of activism that receive high media visibility,” he says.
But beneath that visibility, he detects a broader decline. “Overall, however, the trend is toward less mobilisation and less willingness to participate.” This decline, he argues, reflects structural changes in contemporary life. “This phenomenon can be explained by considering that in contemporary society there are many options for spending one's time, and these options compete with each other. Politics thus becomes just one of many possible activities.”
Participation has costs – and rewards matter. “Strong incentives are therefore needed to convince people to choose one option over another,” Vezzoni says. “Today, however, the incentives offered by traditional politics are scarce or even repulsive. It is therefore unlikely that young people will feel motivated to participate.”
Even highly visible demonstrations can be misleading. “This may seem to contradict very visible phenomena such as demonstrations in support of Palestine or, given that we were talking about the far right, rallies by youth movements from that political area,” he says. “But the paradox can be explained.”
Such movements, he argues, remain limited in scale. “On the one hand, these remain minority phenomena, even if they are highly visible and amplified by media attention.”
At the same time, they reveal something essential about youth participation. “Young people mobilise when their involvement is connected to a strong identity and ideological component,” Vezzoni adds. “In this sense, collective and often unconventional participation provides incentives that traditional participation, and in particular individual participation such as voting, can no longer provide.”
‘Young people mobilise when their involvement is connected to a strong identity and ideological component’ – Cristiano Vezzoni
Issues, rather than parties themselves, often drive mobilisation.
In Germany, Off points to the decisive role of political themes, as young people tend to choose a party based on these issues rather than the party's overall image or individual political leaders – although that can also play a role, in Off’s opinion.
This was visible in the 2021 elections: “Climate change was the major topic that would drive young people and especially young women's vote,” she says. “But also, even back then, digitalisation was a topic that would influence young people's vote for the Liberals.”
But political momentum can fade. “That didn't happen later,” Off says. “Neither topic was interesting for younger voters in the last elections, in 2025. And the parties that stand or stood for those issues lost a lot among young people.”
Reconciling young people and traditional politics
If young voters are drifting away from traditional political participation, can they be brought back?
Some institutional solutions focus on voting habits. Lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 could accustom citizens to voting earlier in life, Lorente Fontaneda argues. “The probability of voting is significantly higher among individuals who have voted in previous elections.”
But political strategies can also shape turnout. “Increasing polarisation and creating highly competitive electoral contexts may reduce youth abstention,” he says. Yet such approaches carry risks, since radical-right parties mobilise young voters precisely through these mechanisms. By exaggerating social problems and constructing alternative narratives in order to generate discontent, radical-right parties can mobilise young voters effectively, Lorente Fontaneda explains.
Other interventions have shown limited impact. “Policies specifically targeted at young people or civic education initiatives have not, as far as I know, produced significant effects in reducing youth abstention,” he says.
Vezzoni believes the challenge is more fundamental, as many young people feel disconnected from political power itself. “Political (in)effectiveness has two components: one refers to the sense of lack of individual resources to be able to act on reality through politics; the other reflects the belief that politics does not listen, that it is indifferent to what citizens think and ask for”, he says.
For Vezzoni, the recipe for winning young people back to politics consists of two ingredients: improving the political proposals and promoting political culture, even before participation.
According to the Italian researcher, education plays a central role. “Educational institutions – in short, schools – should seriously address the issue of political education: non-partisan democratic education for an informed understanding of the major issues at the heart of contemporary conflicts.”
But responsibility does not lie only with institutions. “Young people, too, are called upon to make an effort to pay attention and participate,” Vezzoni says, “in order to become citizens in the highest sense of the word.”
For now, Europe’s young voters remain a force in motion – less predictable, less loyal, and perhaps less convinced that traditional politics can answer their concerns.
Their choices, shaped by identity, issues, and trust, are still being formed.
✍️ Francesca Barca and Gian-Paolo Accardo contributed to this article.
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