Madrid slumps out

Now that it has reached the end of its term, it is tempting to assess the impact of the Spanish Presidency of the European Union, but before we delve into the details, reader be warned: just because it is tempting does not mean it is easy. For a start, even if the argument appears somewhat trite, it is still too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures implemented over the last six months. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is not easy to assess a term in office that was marked by circumstances that were to say the least unprecedented.

Battle to regulate financial markets isn't over

With regard to measures, the most decisive will without a doubt be the new role attributed to the European Central Bank (ECB), which on the basis of decisions taken last month, is being re-organised to facilitate the emergence of a European economic governance. It remains to be seen if this development will give rise to a long-term structural change or if it is simply a temporary provision in response to the ongoing crisis. In other words, once the financial storm has abated, will the austerity coalition led by Germany decide that the role of the ECB should be once again limited to the maintainance of price stability?

So changes at the bank have certainly been historic, though it is hard to say whether they can be deemed to have made history with a capital "H". One thing is certain, and that is that the battle to regulate financial markets, which will remain an ongoing and difficult process, cannot be said to be over.

National governments and emerging European diplomacy

The other measure with major long-term repercussions was the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS): a game-changer that has transformed both the drafting of external policy and the manner in which it is implemented. In theory, it will put an end to the freedom to go it alone enjoyed by member states, the European Council and the European Commission, which will now be forced to adopt a much more integrated approach.

It will also encourage foreign ministers of national governments to re-assess their role to ensure its congruence with emerging European diplomacy. However, in the short term, the EEAS will need to achieve a delicate balance worthy of a seasoned tightrope walker if it is to establish a real European foreign policy, but that is not to say that the effort will not be more than worth it.

No goals apart from sitting everyone down at same table

At the end of the day, the Lisbon Treaty was intended to develop a cohesion in the European Union that would enhance its presence in global affairs, and Spain had ambitions to develop Europe's influence when it assumed the rotating presidency, but adverse circumstances soon began to weigh heavily on its initial enthusiasm. The Spanish government was faced with a sudden deterioration of its image abroad, which forced it onto the defensive. At the same time, its capacity to take the political initiative was limited by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which necessarily implied a diminished role for the rotating presidency that could not but undermine the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero and the Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, who in their bid to move forward in the management of the economic crisis and the development of foreign policy were left with little room for manoeuvre.

In the field of foreign policy, Spain had to contend with the strategic disorientation of the European Union. Notwithstanding the success of the May summit with Latin American leaders, the cancellation of subsequent summits with the United States (scheduled for the end of May) and with Mediterranean countries (planned for 7 June and now postponed until November) amounted to clear evidence that a system of foreign relations based on regular meetings with no real content, and with no real goals apart from sitting everyone down at the same table, can no longer be said to be adequate. In this regard, Brazil and Turkey's singular decision to enter into their own negotiations with Iran and thereafter to vote against futher economic sanctions came as a reminder of the fact overlooked by the EU: that real foreign policy is rarely on the agenda at summits.

Goodbye to rotating presidencies in the EU?

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty resulted in a whole new set of rules. Formulated in sporting terms: Spain was expecting a football match until at the last moment it was informed that the actual game would be basketball. But notwithstanding the foregoing, the Spanish Presidency can lay claim to some success, especially in the context of a particularly difficult period.

This was notably evident in the apparent lack of fuss over the thorny question of sanctions against member states who do not fulfill employment and growth objectives by 2020. It will be interesting to see what happens next, that is when Belgium, which will not have a new government before September, will take over what remains of the rotating presidency. Perhaps we are not only saying goodbye to the Spanish Presidency, but to the whole system of rotating presidencies in the EU. And that may well be the ultimate irony: in the wake of six months under Spanish control, the rotating presidency could well become a thing of the past.