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It doesn’t matter when you read this: somewhere in Europe, farmers have taken their tractors to the streets. Rising fuel cost, competition from cheaper imports, the burden of EU phytosanitary regulations, cuts to the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – the grievances vary, but the protests keep coming. The CAP is probably one of the biggest puzzles into which yet another large piece may now need to fit: the accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the European Union.
Even setting aside the territories siezed by Russia – Crimea and parts of the Donbas – by Ukraine still has 32 million hectares of usable agricultural land, of which 26 million are already under cultivation. That is twice the arable land in France (17 million hectares) and three times that of Spain and Poland (11 million each, according to the World Bank). Were Ukraine to join the EU, it would instantly become the bloc’s leading producer of cereals and oilseeds – rapeseed, sunflower and soybeans.
Neighbouring Moldova is little more than a footnote (1.87 million). Yet its accession trajectory has largely advanced in parallel with Ukraine's, benefiting from the geopolitical momentum created by Kyiv's candidacy while remaining subject to its own merit-based assessment – and absorbing some of the associated risks and anxieties of the bigger candidate.
The agricultural chapter, argues researcher Elsa Régnier in a 2024 study from the Institute for sustainable development and international relations (IDDRI), “is considered among the most difficult in the EU accession process” – a consequence of the CAP’s central role in the EU budget and the structural vulnerability of farming systems. A spokesperson for the European Commission similarly acknowledges that Ukraine and Moldova “will need time and effort,” as the EU “must ensure that its policies, including the CAP, are fit for an enlarged Union.”
“More difficult than the war? Than the Holodomor? I don’t think so. We will adapt,” jokes Volodymyr Rever, a farmer from Lviv in western Ukraine. Like him, many farmers have become both victims and soldiers in the war Russia has unleashed on their fertile steppes.
Ukrainian soil is among the richest in the world. Scientists call it chernozem (black earth), due to the characteristic dark colour created by the accumulation of organic matter in the soil. That matter is called humus, “the essential nutrients for plant growth,” explains Mykhailo Mulenko, researcher at the Khortytsia National Reserve.
“In some areas of central Ukraine, the humus layer can reach up to one metre in thickness, which is extraordinary,” says Mulenko. That depth also makes the soil more resistant to the aggressive techniques of modern agriculture, helping preserve its fertility over the long term.
The agricultural frontline
Much has changed since the early days of the invasion, when Russian tanks’ advance from the north and south seemed unstoppable. Russian ships blockaded the port of Odesa, which handled more than 80% of Ukraine’s agricultural exports; missiles destroyed food-processing and seed factories in Kharkiv; bombs deliberately targeted crops and farm machinery in Chernihiv and Sumy. Mines contaminated the soil across areas crossed by Russian forces.
But they were halted; and Ukraine retained control of the port of Odesa, established new export routes by sea and rail – with the cooperation of Romania and Poland – saved its seeds and harvests, and reorganised its logistics and fuel supply chains. “It is like another frontline: bread is sacred for us, and sowing is a symbol of life. You cannot imagine what it means for Ukrainians, who have survived two world wars and a famine,” says Roman Leshchenko, former Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food.
‘More difficult than the war? Than the Holodomor? I don’t think so. We will adapt’ – Volodymyr Rever
Ukraine’s strength goes beyond the “unique fertility potential of the soil,” says Yves Le Morvan, head of supply chains and markets at the Agridées think tank in France. “Ukraine has strong human capital, as well as resilience in its logistics, trade and processing chains,” he says.
These measures already sparked tensions with neighbouring countries. Hungary, Poland and Slovakia even went as far as imposing bans on Ukrainian imports.
Dănuț Andruș became the face of Romanian farmers’ protests against Ukrainian imports, during which tractors blocked the main road into Bucharest. Ukraine was accused of unfair competition. Today, his position has softened: “I don’t think it’s good, because it will destabilise the market, but every one has the right to do what it wants; if they comply with the rules, I have no problem,” he says.
EU enlargement – an opportunity for reform?
Yet precisely this potential destabilisation – caused by the entry of such a large producer as Ukraine – could become an opportunity. For the European Commission, it may finally provide the political pressure needed for a major reform of the CAP, a process that has been on the table for years.
To date, the EU has undergone seven enlargements. The most recent in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria) and 2013 (Croatia). Of all of them, the only ones comparable to the current negotiations, – “in terms of geopolitical relevance and agricultural impact,” according to Le Morvan – are those of the Iberian Peninsula in 1986 and those of Central Europe in 2004 and 2007.
The 1986 enlargement (Spain and Portugal) increased the EU’s agricultural land area by 30%, while the 2004–2007 enlargements added 44%. The enlargement including Ukraine, Moldova and the Balkans would represent a 28% increase.
In 1986, a simple “adjustment through institutional prices combined with a phased implementation schedule” was sufficient. In 2004–2007, a deep prior reform of the CAP was required – one that “created the system of area-based payments and allowed their gradual rollout to new member states in a normalised legal and economic framework,” Le Morvan explains.
In the case of the future enlargement, a minor adjustment of the CAP will not be enough: “Ukraine is not Poland; it has an agricultural economic model inherited from the former Soviet Union, with land ownership structures and business forms that are external to the EU system,” the expert adds.
He therefore outlines two options: either an accession that falls short of full membership, or, once again, a profound reform of the CAP that includes long-term protective mechanisms.
“The CAP as we know it today could evolve significantly,” says SciencesPo’s Elsa Régnier, noting that negotiations are already underway at European level to define the framework for the 2028–2034 period. With Ukraine’s accession, the EU would face three options: significantly increase the CAP budget (currently around 23–25% of the EU budget), reduce allocations to member states, or propose a decoupled scheme for Ukraine based on its agricultural area. “The CAP is constantly evolving and will continue to evolve,” the Commission notes. Everything will depend on negotiations.
For now this also represents a geopolitical opportunity: Russia’s invasion, the war in Iran, and the ever-present shadow of an aggressive China have all made clear that food sovereignty is a strategic necessity. Ukraine’s accession – the “breadbasket of the world” – could position the EU as a leading global agricultural producer and exporter, while aso strengthening its internal resilience. “EU enlargement policy is more than ever a geostrategic investment in peace, stability, influence, competitiveness and long-term security,” a European Commission spokesperson said.
Moldova has already covered part of this ground, and its experience illustrates some of the challenges Ukraine will also face. In 2014, it signed an Association Agreement that included entry into the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), designed to gradually integrate the Moldovan economy into the EU single market.
The DCFTA reduced or eliminated customs tariffs on a wide range of goods, simplified border procedures, and created a more stable and predictable trade framework. For Moldovan agricultural producers, the DCFTA opened access to the world’s largest consumer market, with more than 450 million people.
A clear success for Moldova, which in 2025 became the EU’s main supplier of sunflower, with a 57.5% smarket hare. The EU is also its main export market for fruit, including plums, apples, table grapes and cherries.
New standards
But these gains come with significant costs. The DCFTA obliges small Moldovan farmers to meet EU phytosanitary and traceability standards, which are far more demanding than what they previously faced. “We already produce according to European Union rules, but without the support European farmers receive,” laments Daniel Leahu, a farmer from northern Moldova.
His products – wheat, barley, peas, rapeseed, sunflower and sorghum – reach the EU market through trading intermediaries. Those exporters “have no problem” with his goods because farmers are “100% aligned with EU requirements, from technology to fertilisers and pesticides.”
Alignment also comes at a price, Leahu notes: “We are no longer allowed to do what was previously permitted, and that leads to more expensive production. We comply with the rules but receive nothing in return. European farmers are paid for organic farming, healthy food production, emission reductions. We do the same, but without the payments.”
Moldova farmers must meet EU standards without yet benefitting from the subsidies, direct payments and other mechanisms available to farmers in member states. Interest rates for Moldovan farmers stand at around 13%, compared to 3–5% for their EU contrerparts. Many small and medium-sized producers cannot absorb the additional costs of pre-accession without sustained financial support.
In what amounts to a plea Ukraine might heed, farmers interviewed by Hotnews.ro call for realistic transition periods and targeted state programmes for gradual adaptation and sector protection.
“Who wants to sell will sell. Who wants to work will work. The European market does not take our land away – it demands quality. We have good soil, we have people who know how to work. The rest depends on how we choose to play in a large market,” says Ion Tulei, a Moldovan farmer whose career reflects this transition from an external market to EU integration.
In 2009, Tulei managed just 10 hectares of orchard. Back then, “goods moved easily, without too many requirements.” But international politics had other plans: in 2014–2015, Russia imposed a sweeping embargo on Moldovan agricultural products in retaliation for Chișinău’s rapprochement with the EU. Tulei sought alternatives, and in 2016–2017 he made his first exports to Germany. From there followed “many difficult decisions”: quality classification, competitive packaging, proper storage… International certifications – such as GlobalG.A.P., GRASP, SMETA and now IFS – became mandatory steps.
“When you enter this system, you understand it is no longer just about selling. It is about process, traceability, responsibility. In practice, you can export anywhere,” says Tulei, who now manages 135 hectares and produces apples, cherries, plums, grapes, and apricots.
For those who have already made this journey, European integration is not an abstract promise but a lived reality: “We are practically already in the European Union in everything but name. I don’t think much will change for us – perhaps only that some bureaucratic procedures will disappear.” The real benefits, he says, will go to farmers who have not yet yet taken that step: easier market access, clear rules, stability and incentives for modernisation.
The fear of French, Spanish and Polish farmers
Fear of the coming enlargement is widely felt among farmers in France, Spain or Poland, who worry that a large influx of cheaper agricultural products – even if they meet phytosanitary standards, production costs in Ukraine and Moldova are generally lower – could destabilise the market.
“It could satisfy importing industries [of cereals], but it could also seriously weaken entire production regions, both in the west and east of the EU,” admits Agridées’ Yves Le Morvan. "In this context,” he argues, émember states should consider establishing specific cross-cutting support measures for intermediate agricultural regions – those with lower productivity that are likely to be particularly affected by enlargement".
‘We are practically already in the European Union in everything but name. I don’t think much will change for us – perhaps only that some bureaucratic procedures will disappear’ – Ion Tulei
Yet in some cases, farmers in candidate countries may actually be less competitive than those already inside the EU – not more. “The European market is very tough. It has extremely high requirements in terms of quality, volume and delivery consistency,” lamsaysents Dinu Todos, a Moldovan farmer who sees limited prospects for joining EU supply chains.
“Without pre-accession funds and transition periods, small and medium-sized agriculture will disappear,” warns Alexandru Slusari, former executive director of the Farmers’ Force Association. “EU environmental standards are extremely strict – and even European farmers question them. Decarbonisation taxes and restrictions on fertilisers and pesticides increase production costs. If Moldova applies them immediately, without transition periods, we risk mass bankruptcy among farmers.” European farmers have already spent years absorbing these costs, while Moldovan or Ukrainian producers would have to adopt them overnight.
The stakes are compounded by the fact that both Moldova and Ukraine are severely undercapitalised agricultural economies – the former due to its small size and years of successive economic crises, the latter due to more than four years of war. “We are undercapitalised and afraid of entering a market where we cannot compete,” says Serghei Ivanov, chair of the Agriculture Committee of the Moldovan Parliament and a farmer by profession, elected in 2025 on the list of the opposition Partidul Nostru, “Our Party,”
Ivanov sees integration "as a double-edged sword": access to EU projects and funding is welcome; entry into a highly competitive market is not. Above all, he worries about land, and that Western European farmers might be tempted by land-grabbing in Moldova, where the land is among the cheapest in Europe. “We need a clear moratorium. We can’t allow a farmer from Germany, where land costs €30,000 per hectare, to come and buy land en masse in Moldova. We need a protection period until our farmers become economically viable and can compete on equal footing,” he points out.
Ukraine’s land ownership structure poses a particular challenge of a different kind: a legacy of Soviet-era collectivisation, Ukrainian farmland is organised into medium and large enterprises. The average farm size is 649 hectares (compared to 60–70 in France and 11–12 in Poland); medium enterprises average around 1,493 hectares; large agroholdings spanning thousands more, often integrating the entire value chain vertically. By EU standards, these amount to agricultural oligopolies – a competition issue that will need to be assessed.
“Europe’s ability to integrate Ukrainian agriculture as it currently exists also raises the inverse question: Ukraine’s adaptation to EU rules and to its business model,” Le Morvan concludes.
“This is a year of intense internal work for us,” said Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka at a meeting in January in Vinnytsia, one of Ukraine’s main agricultural regions, on the theme of the agricultural sector’s path to EU membership. Ukraine, he said, is building the necessary legislative framework, “including strategic planning, a paying agency and digital tools.”
No journey is without challenges, but Alexandru Slusari sees European integration as the only path to agricultural modernisation. “The European Union is essentially the only solution for the modernisation of agriculture. Eastern European countries modernised massively during the pre-accession period, when they gained access to funds. If Moldova negotiates intelligently and prioritises small and medium farmers, in five years we can reach the level of Romania or Slovakia.”
👉 Original article on El Confidencial
🤝 This article was written as part of a cross-border European journalistic collaboration within the EUNeighbours East programme.
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