A turning point for illiberalism in Europe?

Although 2021 started with the promise of a vaccine, and the hope of an end to the pandemic, it ended with yet another new variant and increasing worries that COVID-19 will be with us forever. Consequently, the year was, yet again, dominated by the pandemic and the virus, in both media and politics. And, most likely, so will be the next year. Looking back at 2021, I identify at least four key political developments that will continue to affect European politics in 2022.

1. No Clear Electoral Trends

The past years has seen a lot of “end of populism” and “return of the left” articles. Most of these pieces excelled in the usual cherry-picking of “evidence”, highlighting some results and ignoring others. Focusing on the four key legislative elections in the EU – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, and the Netherlands – we see very different results. The left is only the real winner in Germany, whereas is remains stable in the Netherlands, loses big in Bulgaria (over three elections), and is entirely whipped out in the Czech Republic. 

Similarly, the “mainstream right” (whatever that still means in the 21^st century) was the big loser in Germany, but the big winner in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. Similarly, (right-wing) populism loses somewhat in three countries, compared to peak year 2017 (in the wake of the so-called “refugee crisis”), but gains in the Netherlands. That said, except for the Netherlands, all these countries got new coalition governments and prime ministers who belong to different political groups in Brussels.

Seven legislative elections are scheduled in EU member states for 2022, as well as some relevant presidential elections, most notably in France. Scanning the polls, the picture remains messy, and no clear trends are obvious – except, perhaps, continued fragmentation. In fact, support for the key parties has been remarkable stable in most countries over the last year. And even if there will be a few new governments, there is no indication that these will be predominantly left or right or mainstream or populist. 

2. Polarisation Over COVID-19 Measures

While key governmental COVID-19 measures, from lockdowns to vaccines, are supported by majorities across Europe, the minority that opposes the measures is radicalising. In countries where the far right is not in power, they have become the key voice of the dissenters – which remain a very diverse group, seemingly united in their distrust of the government. Although many far-right parties were among the first to call for repressive measures, in early 2020, most have since shifted to minimising the threat, and sometimes even denying the existence of the virus. As repressive measures continue, and even intensify, protests have become larger and more common. Far-right activists and groups are highly visible within these protests, but they have not been able to capture them in the same way as they did with the protests against refugees in 2015-2016.

Given the disproportionate attention devoted to the loud minority, by media and politics, the pandemic has been the key issue for the far right’s populist campaigns. However, given the broad consensus on stricter border policies, and the fact that they oppose state repression, they cannot really mobilise on the basis of their two other key ideological features, nativism and authoritarianism. This means that, as 2022 will most likely bring more “covid fatigue” and frustration over ineffective government policies, the far right will continue to try and corner the “anti-vax” position, but will not be able to rally broader support around its more popular anti-immigration stand.

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Conspiracy theories and disinformation

1. Right in the heart of Europe, a secret and influential disinformation network does Delhi’s dirty work
2. A very Italian salsa of populism and conspiracy theories
3. QAnon comes to Europe
4. A wade through the swamp of Europe’s conspiracy culture
5. How George Soros was transformed from herald of democracy into Hungary’s “enemy of the people”
6. Andreas Önnerfors: ‘Conspiracy theories are the staple diet of populism in Europe’

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3. COVID-19 is not the Great Disrupter

Last year saw many sensationalist pieces that depicted COVID-19 as “the great disrupter”, which would change the “global order” if not “the world” forever. However, almost two years into the pandemic, the so-called “World 2.0” looks very similar to “World 1.0”, at least in political terms. Not only have we seen few relevant, new political alliances or parties, most governments remain dominated by parties that don’t just predate the pandemic, but all “crises” of the 21^st century. And despite a bit more talk about the role of the state, there is no “Great Reset”. This is not to reject the theoretical possibility of a “Post-Pandemic Brave New World”, but for the moment, this is mere speculation, with little evidence of fundamental changes in attitudes, policies, or voting. 

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The main question for the short to medium term is whether there will be significant economic consequences to the pandemic and, more importantly, how national governments and the EU will respond to them

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Rather, there seems to be a growing group of people who have moved on, or are desperate to move on, from the pandemic, which will further undermine the effectiveness of government policies. The main question for the short to medium term is whether there will be significant economic consequences to the pandemic and, more importantly, how national governments and the EU will respond to them. So far, few politicians have called for austerity measures, but that might change in the near future. Still, given that even the Great Recession has had rather modest effects on European politics, mainly a temporary boost for populist parties and a more structural weakening of the center-left, it is doubtful that the economic consequences of the pandemic will fundamentally transform the continent.

4. The EU: From Brexit to illiberalism

Since 2016 the EU has been mostly preoccupied by Brexit. Even though this seemed finalized with the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement of December 2020, recent threats over the Northern Ireland provisions by the British government have forced Brexit back on the political agenda. Still, it seems that the EU has now realised that the real existential threat does not come from the West but from the East.

The attacks on liberal democracy in Hungary and Poland have finally created European actions, from the de facto expulsion from the European People’s Party (EPP) of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party – technically, Orbán withdrew his party from the EPP in March – to the more recent withholding of tens of billions of dollars in funds from Hungary and Poland. Moreover, the new governments of both Germany and the Netherlands have included an explicit reference to the importance of rule of law within EU member states in their coalition programs.

Although illiberal parties did not lose too much ground in 2021, two important illiberal politicians left center-stage. In the Czech Republic, an increasingly embattled, and therefore radicalising, Andrej Babiš lost the elections and the premiership. Next door, in Austria, former Wunderkind Sebastian Kurz resigned from the Chancellorship and later announced a withdrawal from politics altogether, as investigations into his corrupt and illiberal practices gathered steam. And more might be following in 2022. Next year, there are three crucial elections in this respect, in France, Hungary and Slovenia. 

Most attention will again go to France, where another run-off between outgoing Emmanuel Macron and radical right leader Marine Le Pen remains the most likely scenario, with the former winning, albeit it with a significantly smaller margin than in 2017. However, the rise of far-right newcomer Eric Zemmour has significantly weakened her first-round support, while the recent surge in the polls of Les Républicains (right of centre) leader Valérie Pécresse could even keep her out of the second round.

And where 2022 is unlikely to bring a new right-wing populist to power – barring snap elections in Italy – two sitting illiberal leaders are facing significant electoral challenges. Orbán’s mini-me in Slovenia, Janez Janša, might face the same fate as Babiš, being ousted by broad but determined coalition. And in Hungary, the illiberal leader of Europe is himself facing a finally united and highly mobilized opposition, which could win, depending upon how “unfree and unfair” the elections will be (allowed to be) 

Should these two illiberal leaders also be ousted, Poland’s Law and Justice government will be the last-standing illiberal government in the EU. This means that they will no longer have someone to protect them with a veto in the European Council. With the Great Appeaser out of office in Berlin, and a French-German axis openly hostile to illiberalism, 2022 could therefore become a turning point for illiberalism in Europe. 

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