Europe’s most important election of the year will be in the US

In the end, the Polish elections brought us just a short reprieve. For a few weeks, international media were celebrating how Poland had “shown how to beat populism” – “populism” is the favourite euphemism for far-right in centrist media. But Dutch politicians clearly hadn’t learned the lessons, as they created the perfect conditions for a massive electoral victory for Geert Wilders, just a month later. And so, after a short period of hope, we start yet another year in the shadow of the far-right, dominating headlines and setting the political agenda. 

And yet, in many ways, 2023 was just another year in terms of European politics. The European Union (EU) was able to largely keep its pro-Ukrainian front together, mostly by giving dissenters exceptions to various measures (including sanctions), but has made itself even more irrelevant in the Middle East through its contradictory and disorganised responses to Israel’s brutal retaliations to Hamas’s gruesome initial attack.

At the surface, there were some (alleged) successes: Moldova and Ukraine were fast-tracked for membership, while a new €6 billion “growth plan” was passed to accelerate the halted accession of the Western Balkans. 

---

Whatever the outcome, the EU will probably remain largely the same, i.e. divided over almost everything

---

In terms of national politics, there were no clear electoral or political trends visible in 2023, and most countries muddled through with different levels of success. The governments of both France and Germany continued to lose popular support, and face a growing electoral challenge from the far right, while most other big countries are also mostly inward-focused – the new Polish government will have a hard time de-PiSing the country, Giorgia Meloni is trying to hold her Italian coalition together as much of its economic program has been abandoned or softened, and Pedro Sánchez pulled of a masterful political comeback, but his new and fragile coalition will be haunted by the high price he paid for it, i.e. a highly controversial and unpopular amnesty deal.

In Hungary, EU thorn-in-the-side, Viktor Orbán, has become even more isolated this year. Having lost the vital veto of his Polish allies of Law and Justice (PiS), he will now be dependent upon either Meloni or the returned Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico for protection from EU sanctions; but both have both less close contacts and less self-interest in bailing Hungary out. It will therefore be interesting to see how Orbán will use the EU Presidency, which is slated to move to Hungary for the second half of 2024. He could try to speed up the accession of the Western Balkans, which would add some of his allies to the EU, but will probably mainly leverage his (obstruction) power to release more EU funds and soften EU critique of his “authoritarian kleptocracy”.

So, the EU goes into this Super Election Year with its internal cohesion still intact, albeit increasingly patched up, and its international reputation at a new low. At the top of the electoral agenda, of course, are the European elections, to be held from 6 to 9 June in all 27 member states. With the far-right dominating the media and many polls, as well as the European People’s Party (EPP) having “veered right”, we can expect the European Parliament to become more explicitly right-wing – after the 2019 elections had already “moved the center” rightwards.

Although POLITICO’s Poll of Polls has shown little change in the seat distribution between the different political groups in the European Parliament in the past year, with only minor shifts compared to the 2019 results, these predictions have two shortcomings. First, a significant number of new parties will enter the European Parliament, which are not yet aligned with the existing groups (currently estimated at 41 out of a total of 710 seats).

---

---

Second, the number and content of the different groups can still change. For instance, there are rumors that the EPP was courting Meloni and her Brothers of Italy (FdI) party, while the electoral problems of French President Emmanuel Macron and his LREM party, as well as internal divisions over key issues and campaign strategy, raise doubts about the viability of the liberal Renew group. 

But the most important group to watch is the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), who are courted from two sides. Originally a conservative group, the ECR has been dominated by far-right parties, like PiS and FdI, for many years now. The main difference with the “real” far-right group, Identity & Democracy (I&D) of Marine Le Pen and Wilders, is their “reputational shield,” a leftover from its conservative origins.

But with most I&D parties electorally on the rise, their political exclusion is debated (e.g. in Belgium and even Germany) or outright broken (e.g. Austria and the Netherlands). One big “national conservative” – the far right’s preferred euphemism for itself – group has long been the dream of Orbán, but his openly pro-Putin position is politically too toxic at the moment, which means that his dream will probably have to wait a bit longer.

The EPP wants to profit from this stalemate in far-right collaboration and is increasingly openly playing with the idea to replace the age-old coalition with the center-left Socialists & Democrats (S&D) with a new coalition with the ECR – in many ways bringing EU-level politics in line with national coalition practice. Incidentally, this is another scenario that is strongly supported by pro-Orbán sources.

Whatever the outcome, the EU will probably remain largely the same, i.e. divided over almost everything, while able to muddle through by providing endless compromises and exceptions. While the balance of power is pulled (even) further right, even an EPP-ECR coalition cannot govern without either centre-left S&D or liberal Renew support. This might not affect EU foreign policy towards Russia-Ukraine or Israel-Palestine, but it could impact its relationship with two key western allies, both of which will also hold crucial elections this year.

Let’s start with the least important ones, the not-yet scheduled British parliamentary elections. The Tories have wasted their Brexit Bonus through years of incompetence and infighting. Although Rishi Sunak, the fifth Tory PM since the Brexit vote, has been able to stem the electoral bleeding, the party is still polling below 25%. In fact, the Conservatives are so unpopular, that even the boring and inconsistent Keir Starmer cannot destroy the massive lead of the Labour Party.

But while EU ambassadors have described dealing with the Labour leader “like honey and toast,” it is doubtful that the improved personal relationship will lead to a fundamental revision of the institutional relationship with the UK. Not only is the Labour Party facing deep internal divisions – over issues like the Israel-Gaza conflict – Starmer has so far proven to be an extremely cautious leader who “tiptoes towards power” by staying vague on controversial issues, including EU-UK relations.

Then again, the EU has largely moved on from Brexit – tellingly, the UK was not mentioned once in Ursula von der Leyen’s one-hour long “state of the union” speech last year. However, it will not be able to move on from the US, which will hold crucial elections in November. It seems that European politicians think that ignoring the elephant in the room will prevent him from returning. And while there certainly is a good chance that Joe Biden will be re-elected, we are just one Biden-stroke away from the return of Donald Trump. 

What even many Americans seem to fail to comprehend, at their own peril, is the threat of a second Trump presidency. Some people believe that “American Institutional Exceptionalism” withstood the attacks on liberal democracy in the first Trump presidency. Even if this is true, and institutions always have to be used by (brave) people, there is little reason to assume this will also happen in a second term. Trump is even more unhinged now than he was in the last months of his first term – as he is battling no less than 91 charges in 4 different indictments – so we should expect a scorched earth “revenge term.”

This time around, Trump has the Republican Party unified behind him – no more frustrating compromises with the former Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell – and a large army of political appointees, including competent ones, loyal to the leader rather than to the party or country. And, most importantly, should he return to power, it will almost certainly be with a Republican majority in both houses of Congress, giving Trump full control over the political system, given that the Supreme Court is already controlled by the right. And while his wrath will primarily be directed internally, we must prepare for a far more radical foreign policy too – openly hostile to the EU and barely supportive of NATO.

To be clear, this nightmare scenario is far from certain, but it is also far too important to ignore. Despite warnings from George W. Bush and Trump’s first term, the EU still largely hides behind the US on most important global issues, including Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine. Should Trump truly withdraw from the world, the EU will come under unprecedented external pressures, which will force the, largely contained, fundamental internal divisions to the surface. 

In short, the most important elections next year are not in Europe, even if they can change the foundational power relations in Brussels. And they are certainly not in the UK. No, the most important elections are in the US, outside the control of Brussels and of Europeans. Because, while the EU can survive an EPP-ECR coalition, and certainly a “cautious” Labour government, this is far less certain for a “Trump 2.0” government.

---